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II. SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
Appellant, Emesto Lopez, offers the following argument in response to the issues raised
by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365
(2014). As explained more fully below, the manner in which post-conviction counsel neglected
Mr. Lopez's case goes beyond ineffective assistance of counsel. In these circumstances,
counsel's neglect qualifies as "sufficient reason" under I.C. § 19-4908 to litigate claims
inadequately raised in his initial post-conviction petition in a successive action.
A.

Introduction
On July 10, 2007, Mr. Lopez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. CR

(37206) p. 4. The district court granted Mr. Lopez's request for counsel and ordered that
appointed counsel "investigate the matters and, if necessary, file an amended petition for postconviction relief' within 45 days. Id. at p. 22-23. Appointed counsel thereafter refused to
communicate with Mr. Lopez, to amend his petition or to respond to the state's summary
dismissal motion because of her mistaken impression the initial petition was untimely. !d. at p.
48-5; p. 60-71. p. 74-79; Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 1, ln. 14-20. At a hearing on December 18,
2008, the district court explained that Mr. Lopez's counsel used the incorrect dates and neglected
to apply the prisoner mailbox rule in erroneously concluding that Mr. Lopez's petition was
untimely and there was "at least a good faith argument that he did file it on a timely basis." Tr.
(37206) (Vol. 2) p. 2, ln. 16- p. 5, ln. 17; p. 5, ln. 20-25. The district court then continued the
hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal and set a briefing schedule to allow counsel
to interview Mr. Lopez and respond to the State's motion. !d. at p. 6, ln. 20- p. 8, ln. 25.
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Two months later at a hearing on February 20, 2009, appointed counsel had neither
responded to the State's motion for summary dismissal nor amended the petition. See CR
(37206) p. 1-3; Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 10, ln. 23-25. The parties and district court agreed that
Mr. Lopez's petition was timely and the matter was set out to allow counsel another opportunity
to consult with Mr. Lopez and to respond to the State's request for dismissal. Tr. (37206) (Vol.
2) p. 10, ln. 13- p. 11, ln. 19. At a subsequent hearing on April20, 2009, appointed counsel still
had not responded to the State's motion and was permitted to withdraw due to a conflict of
interest. See CR (37206) p. 1-3; Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 13, ln. 13-20.
No one appeared on Mr. Lopez's behalf at a hearing on May 29, 2009, and the matter was
continued to explore who could represent Mr. Lopez based on the unavailability of attorneys
willing to accept post-conviction appointments. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 2) p. 18, ln. 16- p. 19, ln. 20.
Another attorney was appointed shortly thereafter but moved to withdraw one month later
because he had not been paid by the county public defender and was unsure who would be
responsible for his compensation when the public defender was replaced later that month. CR
(37206) p. 114-15. On August 4, 2009, the district court reviewed the history ofMr. Lopez's
various appointed attorneys, appointed the new county public defender to represent Mr. Lopez
and again set the matter out to allow counsel to communicate with Mr. Lopez. Tr. (37206) (Vol.
3),p.1-4.
The new attorney appointed for Mr. Lopez did not amend his petition or file a written
response to the State's motion. See CR (37206) p. 3. Instead, approximately six weeks after
being appointed, he presented a very brief oral argument in support of Mr. Lopez's prose
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petition. Tr. (37206) (Vol. 3), p. 7, ln. 1-22. The district court dismissed Mr. Lopez's petition.
CR (37206) p. 149. Thereafter, Mr. Lopez initiated the successive post-conviction action that is
the subject of this appeal. As set forth in Mr. Lopez's opening and reply briefs, the district court
erred in refusing to address Mr. Lopez's prose requests for additional time to respond to the
notice of intent to dismiss because counsel had neither communicated with him nor responded to
the notice. The district court further erred in dismissing the successive petition because counsel
did not timely respond to the notice of intent to dismiss.
The manner in which post-conviction counsel neglected Mr. Lopez's case goes beyond
ineffective assistance of counsel and, instead, presents unique and compelling circumstances that
should qualify as "sufficient reason" under I. C. § 19-4908. Accordingly, the case should be
remanded for consideration of Mr. Lopez's successive petition under the proper legal standard.

II.

The Manner in Which Post-Conviction Counsel Neglected Mr. Lopez's Case
Presents Unique and Compelling Circumstances Qualifying as "Sufficient Reason"
Under I.C. § 19-4908 to Litigate Claims Inadequately Raised in His Initial Postconviction Petition in a Successive Action
In Mr. Lopez's opening and reply briefs, he relied on the decades old precedent set forth

in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,635 P.2d 955 (1981), which allowed post-conviction
petitioners to establish sufficient reason T re-litigate inadequately presented post-conviction
claims by showing ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. While his case was pending
oral argument, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Murphy, which held that because
there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings, ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot give rise to sufficient reason under I. C. § 19-4908.
Nonetheless, some circumstances must give rise to "sufficient reason" or the legislature's
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use of that language in the statute would be a nullity. Further, even while holding there is no
constitutional right to post-conviction relief counsel, our Supreme Court remains "cognizant that
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is 'the exclusive means for challenging the validity
of a conviction or sentence' other than by direct appeal." Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737, 228
P.3d 998,1004 (2010) citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215,217,220 P.3d 571,573 (2009).
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the status of an initial-review
collateral proceeding as a prisoner's one and only appeal as to an ineffective assistance claim
may justify an exception to the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral
proceedings. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, Ill S.Ct. 2546 (1991).
Thus, in Eby, the Supreme Court carved an exception to the general rule in civil litigation
that individuals are bound by their attorneys' actions in post-conviction relief proceedings. After
re-affirming its position there is no right to counsel in post-conviction relief proceedings, the
Court held:
given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, and given the complete
absence of meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby to
advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence, we conclude that
this case may present the "unique and compelling circumstances" in which IRCP
60(b)( 6) relief may well be warranted.
Eby, 148 Idaho at 737, 228 P.3d at 1004. Similarly, while ineffective assistance of counsel may

not justify a successive petition, the absence of any meaningful representation must present a
sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908.
This conclusion is consistent with the 1\1urphy Court's reasoning. In holding that
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ineffective assistance of counsel of post-conviction relief counsel is no longer a "sufficient
reason" under I.C. § 19-4908, the Murphy Court outlined the extensive procedural history in that
case, which included legal representation at an evidentiary hearing. The Court cited favorably to
a decision from the Nevada Supreme Court, which reasoned that "defendants have made a sham
out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their ultimate penalty with continuous
petitions for relief that often present claims without a legal foundation." Murphy, 156 Idaho at
_ , 327 P.3d at 371, citing Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (1996);
In contrast to the representation Murphy received, Mr. Lopez's post-conviction counsel
never communicated him, did not apply the correct standard to determine timeliness until
directed by the judge and never filed any documents on his behalf. Mr. Lopez's petition lavished
for more than two years in part because his first attorney repeatedly failed to follow up on the
district court's multiple set overs to allow her to communicate with Mr. Lopez. The case was
then handed off to other attorneys who similarly failed to investigate the case or amend the
petition.
These circumstances are more egregious then the garden variety ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel in Murphy and approach the neglect experienced by the petitioner in
Eby. Indeed, while continuous frivolous petitions may make a sham out of the justice system, the

"representation" Mr. Lopez received makes a sham out of the discretionary appointment of
counsel. While post-conviction counsel may not have to meet the standard of providing
"effective assistance," that representation must have some standards lest the process lose all
integrity.
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While Afurphy foreclosed ineffective assistance of counsel as a sufficient reason under
I. C. § 19-4908, it did not opine on what reasons might be sufficient under the statute. Applying a

standard similar to that recognized in Eby, which also addressed the absence of right to counsel,
is consistent with Idaho Supreme Court precedent. Here, post-conviction counsel neglected Mr.
Lopez's case and did not provide any meaningful representation. This manner of neglect
presents an extraordinary circumstance and should be deemed a "sufficient reason" for relitigating claims in a successive post-conviction action.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Lopez's opening and reply briefs, this Court
should reverse the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Lopez's successive petition and
remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this ]tJlay of July, 2014.
~IN, McKAY & BARTLEIT LLP
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Robyn Fyffe
Attorneys for Emesto Lopez
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